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29 [REDACTED] 70

Approved for Release
July 2000

SECRET 29 [REDACTED] SEP 70 [REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS INFO [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. REGARDING CHILE BOTH OFFICERS COMMENTS REFLECT FOLLOWING:

A. THEY SEE NO LIKELIHOOD THAT ALLENDE CAN BE PREVENTED
FROM TAKING OFFICE 4 NOVEMBER.

B. THEY ASSUME THAT ALLENDE WOULD IMPLEMENT HIS PROGRAM
WITHIN LETTER OF LAW TO EXTENT POSSIBLE BUT ALWAYS IN DIRECTION OF
COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES.

C. NO EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO ALLENDE HAS SO FAR

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MATERIALIZED IN EITHER GOVERNMENTAL OR MILITARY SECTORS.

D. IN ABSENCE OF MAJOR DISORDERS OR OTHER IMMEDIATE CRISIS TYPE SITUATION CHILEAN ARMED FORCES CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO MOVE.

E. CHILEAN ARMY SHORT OF AMMUNITION. ANY MILITARY MOVE WILL IN ALL LIKELIHOOD BE PRECEDED BY EXPLORATION OF POSSIBILITIES TO OBTAIN SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION MOST LIKELY FROM US. OR [REDACTED] SOURCES. TO DATE NO APPROACHES MADE ALONG THOSE LINES.

F. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

G. THERE IS NOW NO PEG FOR A MILITARY MOVE IN FACE OF THE COMPLETE CALM PREVAILING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. BET WAS MISSED ON NIGHT OF 4 SEPTEMBER WHEN TROOPS IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO BREAK UP ALLENDE VICTORY DEMONSTRATION, BUT THIS WATER UNDER BRIDGE.

[REDACTED]

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4. [REDACTED]

5. DEFER TO HQS RE POSSIBLE INTEL DISSEM OF PARA 3. [REDACTED]

S E C R E T

[REDACTED]